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Abstract
We consider the issue of solution uniqueness for portfolio optimization problem and its inverse
for asset returns with a finite number of possible scenarios. The risk is assessed by deviation mea-
sures introduced by [Rockafellar et al., Mathematical Programming, Ser. B, 108 (2006), pp. 515–
540] instead of variance as in the Markowitz optimization problem. We prove that in general one
can expect uniqueness neither in forward nor in inverse problems. We discuss consequences of
that non-uniqueness for several problems in risk analysis and portfolio optimization, including
capital allocation, risk sharing, cooperative investment, and the Black-Litterman methodology. In
all cases, the issue with non-uniqueness is closely related to the fact that subgradient of a convex
function is non-unique at the points of non-differentiability. We suggest methodology to resolve
this issue by identifying a unique “special” subgradient satisfying some natural axioms. This
“special” subgradient happens to be the Steiner point of the subdifferential set.
Key words: Capital allocation, Risk sharing, Portfolio optimization, Cooperative investment,
Black-Litterman model, Convex differentiation, Steiner point
1 Introduction
In various problems in economics and finance, including capital allocation (Kalkbrener, 2005), risk
sharing (Filipovic´ and Kupper, 2008), cooperative investment (Grechuk and Zabarankin, 2017), in-
verse portfolio problem (Bertsimas et al., 2012), and generalized Black-Litterman model (Palczewski and Palczewski,
2018), it is important to be able to identify a unique solution. We show that a solution to many of
such problems can be expressed in an explicit way using a sub-gradient of some convex function
f : RN → R at some point X ∈ RN , and the solution is unique if and only if f is differentiable at X.
Because every convex function f is differentiable almost everywhere (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem
25.5), one may expect that such a solution should be unique in all “practical” cases. While this is in-
deed true in the context of risk sharing, we demonstrate that this intuition fails badly in other contexts.
To resolve this issue, we suggest an axiomatic framework for selecting a unique special sub-gradient,
which we call an extended gradient, from the subdifferential set ∂f(X) of every convex function f
at any point X. In fact, our extended gradient coincides with the Steiner point (Schneider, 1971) of
∂f(X). This allows us to resolve the issue of solution non-uniqueness in various applications.
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Capital allocation problem is one of the basic problems in risk management, which has been stud-
ied in a number of papers, see e.g. Denault (2001), Kalkbrener (2005), and references therein. The
problem is to distribute the risk capital among n subsidiaries or business units. Equivalently (see
Cherny and Orlov (2011)), the problem is to decide how much the risk coming from each subsidiary
contributes to the total (cumulative) risk. Kalkbrener (2005) established nessesary and sufficient con-
ditions on the risk measure for the existence of capital allocation with two highly desirable properties:
linearity and diversification. Unfortunately, linear diversifying capital allocation may be non-unique,
and, in this case, it is unclear which one to select. Cherny and Orlov (2011) suggested an additional
“law-invariance” axiom, under which the capital allocation becomes unique for some specific family
of risk measures, but not in general. Grechuk (2015) introduced so-called “centroid capital alloca-
tion”, which is unique but lacks axiomatic foundation. The present work suggests a capital allocation
approach based on the Steiner point of a sub-differential set, which is always unique and follows from
some natural axioms.
Optimal risk sharing is a classical problem which was originated by Borch (1962), Arrow (1963),
and others, which asks for the optimal redistribution of risk among n agents. Such redistribution is
called Pareto optimal if no agent can decrease their risk without increasing the risk for some other
agents. If agents are allowed to trade, they will eventually arrive at some special Pareto optimal allo-
cation, which is called equilibrium allocation (Filipovic´ and Kupper, 2008). However, if equilibrium
allocation is not unique, which one to choose? Our Steiner point approach can be applied to this
problem as well.
In the problem of cooperative investment, m agents decide that instead of investing individually,
they can form a coalition, buy a joint portfolio, and then distribute the profit of this joint portfolio in
the same way as in the optimal risk sharing problem, see e.g. Xia (2004) and Grechuk et al. (2013).
The utility of investor i is Ui(Zi), where Ui is some utility function and Zi the random wealth of agent
i at the investment horizon. Grechuk and Zabarankin (2017) show that, under some mild conditions
on Ui, cooperative investment is strictly preferable for all agents compared to their optimal individual
investment strategies. In the cooperative investment problem, the coalition’s preferences can be rep-
resented by a cooperative utility function U∗. The coalition solves an optimization problem with the
utility U∗ to find an optimal portfolio with the terminal wealth X∗. This terminal wealth must con-
sequently be distributed among investors: one has to find a Pareto optimal allocation (Z1, . . . , Zm)
such that X∗ =
∑m
i=1 Zi. There are usually infinitely many Pareto-optimal wealth allocations, but
Grechuk and Zabarankin (2017) defined an allocation which can be considered as “fair”. The issue
is that this “fair” allocation is, in general, non-unique, as we demonstrate in this paper. Because this
non-uniqueness is the consequence of possible non-differentiability of U∗, this issue is resolved by
our Steiner point approach provided that U∗ is a concave function.
In the realm of portfolio analysis we consider a market with a riskless asset and n risky assets.
Portfolios are represented as combinations x1R
(1) + · · ·+ xnR
(n), where the vector random variable
R = (R(1), . . . , R(n))T denotes excess returns of risky assets. The objective is to find a portfolio
allocation (fractions of wealth invested in the risky assets) x = (x1, . . . , xn)
T that solves the following
optimization problem:
min
x
ρ(RTx) subject to µTx ≥ ∆, (1)
where ρ measures portfolio risk, ∆ is the target excess return and
µ = (µ1, . . . , µn)
T = (E[R(1)], . . . , E[R(n)])T .
In this paper we study the uniqueness of solutions to problem (1) and solutions to the following
inverse problem: given a vector x∗, the information on the distribution of R sufficient to compute
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ρ(RTx) for any x, and ∆ > 0 find a vector of mean returns µ such that x∗ is a solution to problem
(1) for that µ. Notice that the inverse problem we are interested in is meaningful only when the risk
measure ρ is indifferent to the location parameter of distribution R, e.g., standard deviation, variance
of portfolio returns, or a deviation measure of Rockafellar et al. (2006a).
The problem of portfolio inverse optimization under different formulations has been investigated
by several authors. Bertsimas et al. (2012) consider an inverse optimization in a robust optimization
framework with the portfolio mean as the objective function and risk accounted for in constraints. The
problem of uniqueness is not addressed in that paper, particularly because under their assumption of
normality of asset returns the forward problem always has a unique solution. Due to the number of
degrees of freedom (in the mean-variance case it is both the mean, variance and the target return ∆
that are to be inferred from the optimal portfolio), the inverse problem inherently has many solutions.
Grechuk and Zabarankin (2014, 2016) attempt to infer risk preferences of an investor: assuming a
complete knowledge of the distribution of R and portfolio x∗, they look for a risk measure ρ for
which x∗ is an optimal solution to (1). They solved this inverse problem for two classes of risk
measures ρ: deviation measures and coherent risk measures.
A motivation for analyzing the uniqueness of forward and inverse optimization problems stated
above comes from the Black-Litterman asset allocation model, cf. Black and Litterman (1992) where
the model is formulated and Litterman et al. (2004) for a more detailed presentation. In the classical
Black-Litterman model, the risk is modeled by the variance. The inverse optimization, used to estab-
lish the equilibrium distribution, has a unique solution. The variance, however, is a poor measure of
risk for non-Gaussian distributions. Rockafellar et al. (2006a) promote deviations measures which are
rooted in coherent risk measures but are indifferent to the location parameter of the distribution (as
the variance). The optimization problem (1) retains its convexity in x, but the uniqueness of solutions
to the forward and inverse problems has not been studied. A general theory of convex optimization
implies that they depend on the interplay between the distribution of R and the risk measure ρ. Our
Steiner point approach can be used to identify a unique “special” solution to this problem as well.
In the context of asset management, many papers assume a finite (but possibly very large) number
of scenarios for the future excess returnR, (which for example may correspond to historical time series
of returns of the corresponding portfolio at the specified times in the past, see Grechuk and Zabarankin
(2018)) and this is the case that we research in this paper. Although the questions of existence of opti-
mal solutions has been solved, the problem of uniqueness for finite number of scenarios has not been
analyzed carefully enough. We perform detailed analysis of that problem for arbitrary discrete sce-
narios and a class of deviation measures which we call “finitely generated risk measures”. It includes
Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), mixed CVaR and mean absolute deviation. In our approach we
use the characterization of deviation measures by their risk envelopes introduced in Rockafellar et al.
(2006b).
Our contributions are based on a new link between the uniqueness of an optimal portfolio x∗ in (1)
and the number of risk identifiers for the deviation measure ρ(RTx∗). This has three consequences.
Firstly, the portfolio optimization problem has a unique solution for any µ ∈ Rn that does not belong
to a finite number of hyperplanes; therefore, for practical applications the uniqueness can be safely as-
sumed. Secondly, a unique optimal portfolio corresponds to many risk identifiers and, consequently,
there are many Pareto-optimal sharing arrangements in cooperative investment, which is obviously
highly inconvenient in practice. It is also suprising as this possibility was only inferred from the
general convexity theory and treated as an unlikely and inconvenient case that is not of prime impor-
tance, see Grechuk and Zabarankin (2017). The third consequence is related to the extension of the
Black-Litterman model to arbitrary distributions and deviation measures (Palczewski and Palczewski,
2018). Analogously as in the classical model the first step of the extended model is to solve an inverse
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portfolio problem in which for a market (or benchmark) portfolio x∗ one establishes an equilibrium
mean return µeq that yields x
∗ as an optimal solution, cf. Palczewski and Palczewski (2018, Section
4). We demonstrate that if x∗ is a unique optimal solution for a particular µ∗ then the inverse problem
has multiple solutions. Hence, the final investment recommendation coming out of Black-Litterman
methodology is not unique. Our Steiner point approach is then used to select a unique recommenda-
tion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 suggests a Steiner point approach for
assigning a unique “extended gradient” of every convex function on RN at every point. Section 3
applies this methodology for selecting the unique solution in the capital allocation and risk sharing
problems. Section 4 formulates the portfolio optimization problem in the framework of deviation
measures, defines portfolio risk generators and discusses the portfolio uniqueness problem in terms
of portfolio risk generators. Section 5 formulates the cooperative investment problem and resolves
the issue of non-uniqueness of its solution. Section 6 discusses the dichotomy between uniqueness
of solutions of the forward and inverse optimization problems. Section 7 considers consequences of
non-uniqueness for the Black-Litterman model for non-Gaussian distributions. Section 8 concludes
the work.
2 Extended gradient of a convex function
Let f : Rn → R be an arbitrary (finite valued) convex function. It is known Rockafellar (1970,
Theorem 23.1) that the one-sided limit
φf,Y (X) = lim
ǫ→0+
f(Y + ǫX)− f(Y )
ǫ
(2)
exists for every X,Y ∈ Rn. Limit φf,Y (X) is called the directional derivative of f at Y with respect
toX. We say that f is (Gâteaux) differentiable at Y ∈ Rn if the (two-sided) limit limǫ→0
f(Y+ǫX)−f(Y )
ǫ
exists for every X ∈ Rn. In this case, φf,Y (X) is a linear functional in X, and can be represented as
φf,Y (X) = Q
TX for someQ ∈ Rn, which is usually denoted asQ = ∇f(Y ) and called the gradient
of f at Y . It is known Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 25.5) that any finite-valued convex function f on
Rn is differentiable almost everywhere.
This section develops an axiomatic framework for “extending” the notion of a gradient in such
a way that the “extended gradient” is defined for every convex function f : Rn → R at every point
Y ∈ Rn. In the later sections we will demonstrate that this “extended gradient” is useful in numer-
ous applications, including capital allocation, risk sharing, cooperative investment, inverse portfolio
problem, and the analysis of Black-Litterman model.
Let F be a set of all convex functions f : Rn → R. Formally, we define extended gradient as a
map G : F × Rn → Rn, which assigns to every f ∈ F and Y ∈ Rn a vector GY (f) ∈ R
n, such that
the following properties hold:
(G1) Additivity: GY (f + g) = GY (f) +GY (g) for all f, g ∈ F and all Y ∈ R
n;
(G2) Rotation invariance: Let f ∈ F and g(Y ) = f(AY ), Y ∈ Rn, where A is an n × n rotation
matrix, that is, matrix such that AT = A−1 and det(A) = 1. Then
GY (g) = A
−1GAY (f), ∀Y ∈ R
n.
4
(G3) Continuity: Let Y ∈ Rn, f ∈ F , and f1, f2, . . . be a sequence of functions in F such that
lim
m→∞
φfm,Y (X) = φf,Y (X) for all X ∈ R
n. Then
lim
m→∞
GY (fm) = GY (f).
(G4) Linear differentiation: Let Q ∈ Rn, and let f(Y ) = QTY, ∀Y ∈ Rn be a linear function.
Then
GY (f) = Q, ∀Y ∈ R
n.
Properties (G1)-(G4) are desirable properties for any extension of the concepts of “derivative”
or “gradient”. (G1) states that the derivative/gradient of a sum is the sum of derivatives/gradients of
summands, (G2) is an invariance under rotation of the coordinate system, (G3) is a manifestation of
the fact that derivative/gradient is a local property of a function at a point, and two functions which
“look locally almost the same” in every direction should have “almost identical” gradients. Finally,
(G4) states that the derivative/gradient of a linear function is a constant. Theorem 2.2 below states
that, somewhat surprisingly, these natural properties are sufficient for the unique characterization of
G.
Directional derivative φf,Y (X) can be represented in the form
φf,Y (X) = sup
Q∈∂f(Y )
QTX (3)
see Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 23.4), where ∂f(Y ) is called subdifferential of f at Y , and is defined
as a set of all Q ∈ Rn such that f(X) ≥ f(Y ) + QT (X − Y ), ∀X ∈ Rn. Set ∂f(Y ) is always
non-empty, convex, and compact, see Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 23.4). Let K be the family of all
non-empty convex compact subsets of Rn.
With f1 = f2 = · · · = fm = · · · = g, property (G3) implies that GY (f) = GY (g) whenever
φf,Y (X) = φg,Y (X) for all X ∈ R
n. Equivalently, GY (f) = GY (g) whenever ∂f(Y ) = ∂g(Y ).
Hence GY (f) can be represented as
GY (f) = S(∂f(Y )), (4)
where S is a map assigning to every set K ∈ K a vector S(K) ∈ Rn.
Properties (G1)-(G4) of GY (f) can be equivalently written as properties of the map S. For any
K1,K2 ⊂ R
n, the set K1 + K2 = {Q1 + Q2 |Q1 ∈ K1, Q2 ∈ K2} is called (Minkowski) sum of
K1 and K2. Theorem 23.8 in Rockafellar (1970) implies that ∂((f + g)(Y )) = ∂f(Y ) + ∂g(Y ) for
all f, g ∈ F and all Y ∈ Rn. Hence, property (G1) is equivalent to
(S1) S(K1 +K2) = S(K1) + S(K2) for all K1 ∈ K,K2 ∈ K.
Property (G4) is equivalent to S({Q}) = Q. Substituting this into (S1), we get S(K + Q) =
S(K) + Q. In other words, if the set K is translated by a vector Q ∈ Rn, S(K) is translated by the
same vector.
LetA, f , and g be as defined in (G2). Theorem 23.9 in Rockafellar (1970) implies that ∂(g(Y )) =
A−1∂f(AY ). Hence, property (G2) is equivalent to S(AK) = AS(K), ∀K ∈ K. This implies that
S(AK +Q) = AS(K) +Q for all Q ∈ Rn, or, equivalently,
(S2) S(TK) = TS(K) for all K ∈ K and all transformations T : Rn → Rn in the form T (X) =
AX +Q, where A is a rotation matrix, and Q ∈ Rn. Such transformations T are called proper
motions.
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For every non-empty closed convex set K in Rn, its support function is given by fK(X) =
sup{QTX, |Q ∈ K}. In particular, (3) implies that directional derivative φf,Y (X) is a support
function of the subdifferential ∂f(Y ). For sets K,K1,K2, . . . in K, a combination of Corollary P4.A
and Corollary 3A in Salinetti and Wets (1979) implies that point-wise convergence of the support
functions of Km to the support functions of K is equivalent to limm→∞ h(Km,K) = 0, where h
denotes the Hausdorff distance1 between sets. This implies the following reformulation of property
(G3).
Lemma 2.1. Let S : K → Rn, and let GY be given by (4). Then GY satisfies (G3) if and only if S
satisfies
(S3) Map S is continuous with respect to the Hausdorff metric. That is,
lim
m→∞
S(Km) = S(K)
whenever sets K,K1,K2, . . . ∈ K are such that lim
m→∞
h(Km,K) = 0.
Proof. First, assume that (S3) holds, Y ∈ Rn, f ∈ F , and fm is a sequence of functions as in (G3).
Let K = ∂f(Y ), Km = ∂fm(Y ). Then φf,Y (X) and φfm,Y (X) are the support functions of K and
Km, respectively, and condition limm→∞ φfm,Y (X) = φf,Y (X) implies that lim
m→∞
h(Km,K) = 0.
Then, by (S3), lim
m→∞
S(Km) = S(K), which, by (4), is translated to limm→∞GY (fm) = GY (f)
and proves (G3).
Conversely, assume that (G3) holds and letK,K1,K2, . . . ∈ K be such that limm→∞ h(Km,K) =
0. Let f0, f1, f2, . . . be the support functions of these sets. Then limm→∞ fm = f0 point-wise. Be-
cause each fm is positively homogeneous, its directional derivative at Y = 0 is φm(X) = limǫ→0+
fm(0+ǫX)−fm(0)
ǫ
=
fm(X). Hence, limm→∞ φm = φ0 point-wise, and (G3) with Y = 0 implies that limm→∞G0(fm) =
G0(f). With (4), this translates to limm→∞ S(Km) = S(K) and proves (S3).
In summary, GY (f) satisfies properties (G1)-(G4) if and only if it is representable in the form (4),
with a map S : K → Rn satisfying (S1)-(S3). However, Theorem 1 in Schneider (1971) states that, in
any dimension n ≥ 2, there is a unique map S satisfying (S1)-(S3), and it is given by
S(K) =
n
|Sn−1|
∫
Sn−1
XfK(X)dX, (5)
where Sn−1 = {X ∈ Rn | ||X|| = 1} denotes the unit sphere in Rn, |Sn−1| is its surface area, and
fK(X) is the support function of K . S(K) is knows as Steiner point of the set K . Equivalently (see
e.g. Dentcheva (1998)),
S(K) =
1
|B1|
∫
B1
∇fK(X)dX, (6)
where B1 = {X ∈ R
n | ||X|| ≤ 1} denotes the unit ball, ∇ is the gradient, and the integral is
well-defined because the support function of any K ∈ K is differentiable almost everywhere. If
K = ∂f(Y ), its support function is φf,Y (X), and we obtain
GY (f) = S(∂f(Y )) =
1
|B1|
∫
B1
∇φf,Y (X)dX. (7)
We will summarise the above discussion in the following theorem.
1The Hausdorff distance h(K,L) between any subsets K and L of Rn is defined as h(K,L) =
max{supX∈K infY ∈L d(X,Y ), supY ∈L infX∈K d(X,Y )}, where d(., .) in the usual Euclidean distance in R
n.
6
Theorem 2.2. In any dimension n ≥ 2, the extended gradient GY (f) is uniquely characterized by
properties (G1)-(G4), and it is given by (7), where φf,Y (X) is defined in (2).
The next theorem provides an alternative formula for extended gradient GY (f).
Theorem 2.3. For every convex function f : Rn → R, and every Y ∈ Rn, the extended gradient
GY (f) is given by
GY (f) = lim
ǫ→0+
1
|Bǫ(Y )|
∫
Bǫ(Y )
∇f(X)dX, (8)
where Bǫ(Y ) = {X ∈ R
n | ||X − Y || ≤ ǫ} is the ball centred at Y with radius ǫ, ∇ is the (almost
everywhere defined) gradient of f , and the limit is guaranteed to exist.
Proof. Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 24.6) states that, for a sequence X1,X2, . . . in R
n converging to
Y but distinct from Y such that limi→∞
Xi−Y
||Xi−Y ||
= Z ∈ Sn−1, and any δ > 0, there exist an index i0
such that
∂f(Xi) ⊂ ∂f(Y )Z +Bδ(0), ∀i ≥ i0, (9)
where ∂f(Y )Z is the set of points of ∂f(Y ) in which Z is normal to ∂f(Y ). In other words,
∂f(Y )Z = argmax
Q∈∂f(Y )
QTZ.
Let Z ∈ Sn−1 be such that ∂f(Y )Z is a singleton (which we denote gf,Y (Z)), and ∂f(Y + ǫZ) =
{∇f(Y + ǫZ)} is a singleton for almost all sufficiently small ǫ > 0. By Rockafellar (1970, Theorem
25.5), these conditions hold for almost every Z ∈ Sn−1 (as g(Z) := maxQ∈∂f(Y )Q
TZ is convex
and ∂f(Y )Z = ∂g(Z)). In this case, (9) with Xi = Y + ǫiZ , ǫi → 0
+, implies that the limit
limǫ→0+∇f(Y + ǫZ) exists and equals to gf,Y (Z).
Because the definition of gf,Y (Z) depends only on Z and ∂f(Y ), vector gf,Y (Z) remains un-
changed if we replace f by any other convex function h with ∂f(Y ) = ∂h(Y ). In particular,
this is true for h(X) = φf,Y (X − Y ). Hence, by the same argument, limǫ→0+∇h(Y + ǫZ) =
limǫ→0+∇φf,Y (ǫZ) = gf,Y (Z). However, (2) implies that φf,Y is a positive homogeneous function,
that is, φf,Y (ǫZ) = ǫφf,Y (Z) for all ǫ > 0. Hence, gradient ∇φf,Y (ǫZ) does not depend on ǫ, and in
fact ∇φf,Y (ǫZ) = gf,Y (Z) for all ǫ > 0. In particular, ∇φf,Y (Z) = gf,Y (Z).
Because limǫ→0+∇f(Y + ǫZ) = gf,Y (Z) = ∇φf,Y (Z), for every δ > 0, there exists an ǫ(Z) >
0 such that ||∇f(Y + ǫZ) − ∇φf,Y (Z)|| < δ for every ǫ ≤ ǫ(Z). In fact, we can select ǫ
∗ > 0,
such that for ǫ ≤ ǫ∗ the inequality ||∇f(Y + ǫZ) − ∇φf,Y (Z)|| < δ holds true for all Z from the
unit sphere except of a set of measure at most δ. With X = Y + ǫZ , ∇φf,Y (Z) = ∇φf,Y (ǫZ) =
∇φf,Y (X − Y ), and the last inequality is equivalent to ||∇f(X) − ∇φf,Y (X − Y )|| < δ. Because
||∇f(X)|| ≤ C, ∀X ∈ B1(Y ) for some constant C > 0 Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 24.7), this
proves that
lim
ǫ→0+
1
|Bǫ(Y )|
∫
Bǫ(Y )
(∇f(X)−∇φf,Y (X − Y )) dX = 0. (10)
Since the gradient ∇φf,Y (ǫZ) does not depend on ǫ, we have
1
|Bǫ(Y )|
∫
Bǫ(Y )
∇φf,Y (X − Y )dX =
1
|B1(Y )|
∫
B1(Y )
∇φf,Y (X − Y )dX
=
1
|B1(0)|
∫
B1(0)
∇φf,Y (X)dX = GY (f),
which together with (10) completes the proof.
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Theorem 2.3 gives a nice intuitive interpretation of GY (f): it is an average gradient of f in a
small ball centred in Y when the radius of the ball goes to 0. Because Steiner point of any set K ∈ K
belongs toK , (7) implies that GY (f) ∈ ∂f(Y ), or, in words, extended gradient always belongs to the
subdifferential set. In particular, GY (f) = ∇f(Y ), whenever the latter exists. Theorem 2.2 implies
that GY (f) is the only way to define the gradient of every convex function f at every point Y such
that the natural properties (G1)-(G4) are satisfied.
Remark 2.4. While Theorem 2.2 is applicable in dimension n ≥ 2, extended gradient (7)-(8) can be
studied in dimension n = 1 as well. For a convex function f : R → R, and every y ∈ R, Gy(f) in
(7)-(8) is given by
Gy(f) =
f ′+(y) + f
′
−(y)
2
,
where f ′+(y) and f
′
−(y) are right and left derivatives of f at y, respectively.
Alternative characterization of GY (f) follows directly from Theorem 2.3.
Definition 2.5. We say that a map h : Rn → Rm is robust if, for all Y ∈ Rn, the limit
lim
ǫ→0+
1
|Bǫ(Y )|
∫
Bǫ(Y )
h(X)dX (11)
exists and is equal to h(Y ).
The term “robust” originates in the fact that if we “measure” Y with an error E, uniformly dis-
tributed2 in a small ball, then h(Y ) is the expected value of h evaluated at the point Y + E. Ob-
viously, any continuous map is robust but the converse is not true. For example, take n = m = 1
and f(x) = sign(x) (that is, f(x) = 1, f(x) = 0 and f(x) = −1 for x > 0, x = 0, and x < 0,
respectively). Then f(x) is discontinuous at 0 but it is robust. Theorem 2.3, together with almost
everywhere differentiability of any convex function, implies that GY (f), treated as as function of Y
for a fixed f , is the only map from Rn to Rn, which is (i) robust and (ii) GY (f) = ∇f(Y ) whenever
the latter exists.
Multiplying both sides of (8) by ZT for any Z ∈ Rn, we get
ZTGY (f) = lim
ǫ→0+
1
|Bǫ(Y )|
∫
Bǫ(Y )
ZT∇f(X)dX = lim
ǫ→0+
1
|Bǫ(Y )|
∫
Bǫ(Y )
φf,X(Z)dX, (12)
that is, ZTGY (f) is the average value of the directional derivative of f in direction Z in a small ball
around Y . This fact provides another characterization of GY (f).
3 An application to capital allocation and risk sharing
Assume that the probability space Ω is finite with N = |Ω| and P(ω) > 0 for any ω ∈ Ω. A random
variable (r.v.) X on Ω can be identified as a vector X = (X1, . . . ,XN ) in R
N . We will, therefore,
treat the space V = L2(Ω) of all random variables as the space RN with the Euclidean norm.
2In fact, the error may equivalently be normally distributed. This follows from the rotation invariance property of the
multivariate standard normal distribution.
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3.1 Capital allocation
Let r.v. Y ∈ V represents a (random) profit of some portfolio, consisting of m sub-portfolios, that
is, Y =
∑m
i=1Xi. Let ρ : V → R be a function such that ρ(X) represents the risk associated with
any X ∈ V . The capital allocation problem is the problem of distributing risk capital ρ(Y ) among
sub-portfolios, that is, assigning to sub-portfolio i its risk contribution ki such that
∑n
i=1 ki = ρ(Y ).
The problem is to develop a system of “natural” axioms defining a unique capital allocation scheme.
Kalkbrener (2005) suggested that the risk contribution ki should depend only on Xi and Y , but
not on the decomposition of Y −Xi among the rest of sub-portfolios. In this case, capital allocation
is a function Λρ : V × V → R such that Λρ(Y, Y ) = ρ(Y ), ∀Y ∈ V , and
(i) X 7→ Λρ(X,Y ) is a linear function;
(ii) Λρ(X,Y ) ≤ ρ(X) for all X,Y ∈ V .
Condition (i) guarantees that
∑n
i=1 ki = ρ(Y ), where ki = Λρ(Xi, Y ), and condition (ii) is called di-
versification, see Kalkbrener (2005) for further discussion and justification. Theorem 4.2 in Kalkbrener
(2005) states that a linear diversifying capital allocation Λρ exists if and only if ρ is
(i) positively homogeneous, that is, ρ(λX) = λρ(X) for all λ ≥ 0 and X ∈ V , and
(ii) sub-additive, that is, ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ) for all X,Y ∈ V .
Moreover, Theorem 4.3 in Kalkbrener (2005) guarantees that, for any positively homogeneous and
sub-additive ρ, a linear diversifying Λρ is unique if and only if ρ is differentiable at Y ; in this case
Λρ(X,Y ) = X
T∇ρ(Y ). Because any finite-valued convex function ρ on RN is differentiable al-
most everywhere by Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 25.5), this implies that linear diversifying capital
allocation is unique for almost all Y .
However, Example 3 in Grechuk (2015) demonstrates that if the initial portfolio Y is not “ar-
bitrary” but is a result of natural risk-minimization policy, then it may happen that Y is “forced”
to belong to exactly the (measure zero) set in which ρ is not differentiable. Hence, the problem of
identifying a unique capital allocation scheme reduces to the problem of “extending” the notion of a
gradient of a convex function ρ : Rn → R, such that the “extended gradient” is defined at every point
Y ∈ Rn, that is, exactly to the problem we have addressed in Section 2. The resulting capital alloca-
tion is given by Λ∗ρ(X,Y ) = X
TGY (ρ), where GY (ρ) is the extended gradient of ρ at Y , defined in
Section 2. By (12), Λ∗ρ(X,Y ) is the only capital allocation scheme which is linear, diversifying, and
such that
Λ∗ρ(X,Y ) = lim
ǫ→0+
1
|Bǫ(Y )|
∫
Bǫ(Y )
Λ∗ρ(X,Z) dZ, ∀X,Y ∈ V.
In the terminology of Definition 2.5, the last property states that Λ∗ρ(X,Y ) is robust in a second
argument.
3.2 Risk sharing
Assume that there are n agents, indexed by I = {1, 2, . . . ,
n}. Each agent i ∈ I has an initial endowment Yi ∈ V , and an associated risk measure ρi : V → R.
The agents aim to redistribute the total endowment Y =
∑m
i=1 Yi among themselves to reduce their
risk. Agent i ∈ I receives the part Xi ∈ V of the total endowment such that
∑m
i=1Xi = Y ; the
vector ~X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xn) is called the risk allocation. A risk allocation ~X is called Pareto op-
timal if there is no risk allocation ~Z = (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn) with ρi(Zi) ≤ ρi(Xi), i ∈ I , with at least
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one inequality being strict. If the vector ~Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) of all initial endowments is not Pareto
optimal, it is beneficial for all agents to switch to a Pareto optimal one.
However, there are typically many Pareto optimal allocations, and the problem is how to choose
a “fair” one among them? A natural approach is to allow agents to trade and select an allocation to
which they arrive at an equilibrium. Consider a linear continuous functional P : V → R, such that
P (1) = 1 and P (X) ≥ 0 whenever X ≥ 0, which we will call a price functional. For a fixed P ,
agent i ∈ I solves the optimization problem
min
Xi∈V
ρi(Xi), s.t. P (Xi) ≤ P (Yi), (13)
that is, tries to find an Xi with the minimal risk she can buy in exchange of the initial endowment
Yi. If X
∗
i , i ∈ I , are optimal solutions to (13), and
∑m
i=1X
∗
i = Y , then
~X∗ = (X∗1 ,X
∗
2 , . . . ,X
∗
n)
is a risk allocation assigning to each agent her “optimal share”. Such risk allocation is called an
equilibrium allocation, and the corresponding P is called an equilibrium price. The First Welfare
Theorem (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) states that, under some general conditions on risk measures, every
equilibrium allocation ~X∗ is Pareto optimal, and such an allocation is considered to be a “natural”
and “fair” choice from a Pareto optimal set. If an equilibrium allocation ~X∗ is unique, this solves the
problem completely. However, if it is not unique, which one to choose?
If risk measures ρi are cash-invariant, that is, ρi(X + C) = ρi(X) − c for every X ∈ V and a
constant C = (c, c, . . . , c), then risk allocation ~X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xn) is Pareto optimal if and only
if it minimizes the total risk
∑m
i=1 ρi(Xi) over all possible risk allocations. If, moreover, all ρi are
also positively homogeneous and sub-additive, then so is the functional
ρ∗(Y ) = inf
~X:
∑n
i=1Xi=Y
m∑
i=1
ρi(Xi),
mapping the total endowment Y to the corresponding total risk. In this case, it is known (see
Filipovic´ and Kupper (2008)) that equilibrium prices P correspond to the elements of the sub-gradient
set ∂ρ∗(Y ) of the convex function ρ∗ at Y . Hence, the choice of unique equilibrium allocation re-
duces to the problem we have solved in Section 2. Specifically, we suggest that the equilibrium price
corresponding to the Steiner point (5)-(6) of ∂ρ∗(Y ) should be selected.
In the context of risk sharing, however, our contribution has only theoretical importance, because
in practice we expect ∂ρ∗(Y ) to be a singleton due to differentiability of convex function ρ∗ almost
everywhere.
4 Mean-deviation portfolio optimization
4.1 Finitely generated deviation measures
As in the previous section, assume that the probability space Ω is finite with N = |Ω| and P(ω) > 0
for any ω ∈ Ω. A finite probability space Ω will be called uniform, if P[ω1] = · · · = P[ωN ] =
1
N
.
Let R(i), i = 1, . . . , n, be random variables denoting the rates or return of financial instruments.
We assume that there exists also a risk-free instrument with a constant rate of return r0. Following
Rockafellar et al. (2006b), we also assume that
(M) any portfolio X =
∑n
i=1 xiR
(i) is a non-constant random variable for any non-zero x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n.
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Rockafellar et al. (2006b) formulated portfolio optimization problem as follows
min
(x0,x1,...,xn)
D
(
n∑
i=0
xiR
(i)
)
, s.t.
n∑
i=0
xi = 1,
n∑
i=0
xiE[R
(i)] ≥ r0 +∆, (14)
where ∆ > 0 and D is a general deviation measure, that is, a functional D : L2(Ω) → [0;∞]
satisfying:
(D1) D(X) = 0 for constant X, but D(X) > 0 otherwise (non-negativity),
(D2) D(λX) = λD(X) for all X and all λ > 0 (positive homogeneity),
(D3) D(X + Y ) ≤ D(X) +D(Y ) for all X and Y (subadditivity),
(D4) set {X ∈ L2(Ω)
∣∣D(X) ≤ C} is closed for all C <∞ (lower semicontinuity).
With centered rates of return Rˆ(i) = R(i)−E[R(i)], i = 1, . . . , n, and µi = E[R
(i)]−r0, i = 1, . . . , n,
problem (14) can be reformulated as
min
x∈Rn
D(RˆTx), s.t. µTx ≥ ∆, (15)
where Rˆ = (Rˆ(1), . . . , Rˆ(n))T , x = (x1, . . . , xn)
T , and µ = (µ1, . . . , µn)
T . We chose to use a
distinct notation D to indicate this particular choice of the risk measure ρ in (1) as this will be the
default setting for the rest of the paper.
By Rockafellar et al. (2006a, Theorem 1), every deviation measure D can be represented in the
form
D(X) = EX + sup
Q∈Q
E[−XQ], (16)
where Q ⊂ L2(Ω) is called risk envelope and can be recovered from D by
Q =
{
Q ∈ L2(Ω)
∣∣ E[X(1 −Q)] ≤ D(X) ∀X ∈ L2(Ω)}. (17)
Moreover, the set Q is closed and convex in L2(Ω). Elements Q ∈ Q for which supremum in (16) is
attained are called risk identifiers of X. The set of all risk identifiers of X is denoted Q(X).
A deviation measure D is finite, that is, D(X) < ∞, ∀X if and only if the corresponding Q is
bounded. In this case, Q(X) is non-empty for everyX ∈ L2(Ω), and, due to closeness and convexity
of Q and linearity of Q 7→ E[−XQ], every set Q(X) must contain at least one extreme point of Q.
Therefore, supQ∈QE[−XQ] = maxQ∈Qe E[−XQ], where Q
e is the set of all extreme points of Q.
In fact, a bounded closed convex Q is the closed convex hull ofQe, see Theorem 2 in Phelps (1974)3.
Of particular importance to this paper will be the set of such risk measures for which the set Qe is
finite:
Definition 4.1. A finite deviation measure D is called finitely generated if the set Qe of all extreme
points of Q is finite. We will call elements of this set extreme risk generators.
In other words, D is finitely generated if and only ifQ is a convex hull of a finite number of points.
3 Because L2(Ω) is a reflexive Banach space, it has the Radon-Nikodym property, and Theorem 2 in Phelps (1974)
applies.
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Example 1. For standard deviation, σ(X) = ||X−E[X]||2, the risk envelope is given by Rockafellar et al.
(2006b, Example 1)
Q =
{
Q
∣∣ E[Q] = 1, σ(Q) ≤ 1},
and, for N > 2, has infinitely many extreme points, hence σ is not finitely generated.
Example 2. For mean absolute deviation, MAD(X) = E[|X − E[X]|], the risk envelope is given by
Rockafellar et al. (2006b, Example 2)
Q =
{
Q
∣∣ E[Q] = 1, supQ− inf Q ≤ 2},
which is a convex polytope in RN with a finite number of vertices. HenceMAD is finitely generated.
In fact, extreme points Qe can be explicitly written as
Qe =
{
Q = 1 + E[Z]− Z
∣∣ ∃S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} : Zi = 1, i ∈ S; Zi = −1, i 6∈ S},
which for a uniform probability on Ω simplifies to
Qe =
{
x ∈ RN
∣∣ ∃S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} : xi = 2|S|
N
− 1, i ∈ S; xi =
2|S|
N
+ 1, i 6∈ S
}
,
where the subset S is taken non-empty and proper. Hence, |Qe| = 2N − 2.
Example 3. For CVaR-deviation
CVaR∆α (X) ≡ E[X] −
1
α
∫ α
0
qX(β) dβ, (18)
the risk envelope is given by Rockafellar et al. (2006b, Example 4)
Qα =
{
Q
∣∣ E[Q] = 1, 0 ≤ Q ≤ α−1}.
The linearity of constraints imply that CVaR∆α is finitely generated. In particular, if the probability is
uniform over Ω and α = k
N
for some integer 1 ≤ k < N , extreme points Qe are
Qe =
{
x ∈ RN
∣∣ ∃S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} : |S| = k, xi = N
k
, i ∈ S; xi = 0, i 6∈ S
}
.
This implies that |Qe| = N !
k!(N−k)! .
Lemma 4.2. Let D1,D2, . . . ,Dm be finitely generated deviation measures. Then functionals
(a) D(X) =
∑m
i=1 λiDi(X), with λi > 0, i = 1 . . . ,m;
(b) D(X) = max{D1(X), . . . ,Dm(X)}
are also finitely generated deviation measures.
Proof. Proof follows from Rockafellar et al. (2006a, Proposition 4), and from the fact that if sets
Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qm are all convex hulls of a finite number of points, then so are the sets: λ1Q1 + · · · +
λmQm; the convex hull of Q1 ∪ · · · ∪ Qm; and {Q |Q = (1− λ) + λQi for some Qi ∈ Qi}, λ > 0,
i = 1, . . . ,m.
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Example 4. Mixed CVaR-deviation
CVaR∆λ (X) =
∫ 1
0
CVaR∆α (X)λ(dα), (19)
where λ is a probability measure on (0, 1), is also finitely generated. Indeed, because the probability
space is finite, mixed CVaR-deviation (19) can be written as a finite mixture of CVaR-deviations
CVaR∆λ (X) =
m∑
i=1
λiCVaR
∆
αi
(X),
where αi ∈ (0, 1), λi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, and
∑m
i=1 λi = 1, which is a finitely generated deviation
measure due to Example 3 and Lemma 4.2(a).
4.2 Optimal portfolios and active portfolio risk generators
We make the following standing assumptions:
(A) The deviation measure D is finitely generated.
(B) ∆ > 0 and µ 6= 0.
The latter assumption implies the following properties of the optimal solution to (15).
Lemma 4.3. The optimal objective value in (15) is positive and in optimum the constraint is binding:
µTx = ∆.
Proof. By Theorem 1 in Rockafellar et al. (2006b), there is an optimal solution x∗. By assumption
(B), x = 0 does not satisfy the constraint on the expected return, and so x∗ 6= 0. Due to assump-
tion (M), we conclude that RˆTx∗ is random and hence D(RˆTx∗) > 0. For the second part of the
statement, assume that µTx∗ > ∆. Therefore, there is η < 1 such that µT (ηx∗) ≥ ∆ and we have
D(RˆT (ηx∗)) = ηD(RˆTx∗) < D(RˆTx∗), a contradiction.
Since D is finitely generated, the deviation measure of a centered return of portfolio x ∈ Rn can
be expressed as a maximum of a finite number of terms:
D(RˆTx) = max
Q∈Qe
E[−RˆTxQ]. (20)
As the number of extreme risk generators forD is finite, they can be enumerated: Qe = {Q1, . . . , QM ′}.
Define D˜i = E[−RˆQi], i = 1, . . . ,M
′. It follows from (20) that the set of D˜i’s is sufficient to evalu-
ate D(RˆTx) for a portfolio x:
D(RˆTx) = max
i=1,...,M ′
D˜Ti x. (21)
It may happen that D˜i = D˜j for some i 6= j; for example, Rˆ may be constant on a number of
elementary events in Ω. It may also happen that D˜i is not an extreme point of conv{D˜1, . . . , D˜M ′},
but a subset of D˜i’s forms all extreme points of this set Rockafellar (1970, Theorem IV.19.3). For the
convenience of future arguments, we choose only those vectors D˜i that are extreme points.
Definition 4.4. Extreme points of conv{D˜1, . . . , D˜M ′} are denoted by Di, i = 1, . . . ,M , and called
portfolio risk generators.
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Remark 4.5. Portfolio risk generators are generators (in the sense of Rockafellar (1970, Section 19))
of the polyhedral set {E[−RˆQ] |Q ∈ Q}, see the proof of Theorem 19.3 in Rockafellar (1970).
By Definition 4.4 and (21), it is easy to see that for any portfolio x:
D(RˆTx) = max
i=1,...,M
DTi x. (22)
Definition 4.6. Those Di that realize the maximum in (22) are called active portfolio risk generators
for the portfolio x.
The following lemma shows that the set of portfolio risk generators is sufficiently rich to span the
whole space Rn.
Lemma 4.7. lin(D1, . . . ,DM ) = R
n.
Proof. Assume the opposite and take any non-zero vector x in the orthogonal complement of lin(D1, . . . ,DM ).
Then D(RˆTx) = 0. However, RˆTx is non-constant by assumption (M), so its deviation measure
should be strictly positive by (D1). A contradiction.
The representation (22) of the deviation measure of a portfolio x enables an equivalent formulation
of optimization problem (15) as a linear program:
minimize A,
subject to: A ≥ DTi x, i = 1, . . . ,M,
µTx ≥ ∆,
(A, x) ∈ R× Rn.
(23)
The solution (A∗, x∗) is relates to (15) as follows: x∗ is the optimal portfolio while A∗ = D(RˆTx∗).
Theorem 4.8. The linear program (23) as well as the optimization problem (15) have the following
properties:
1. The set of optimal portfolios X∗ is a bounded polyhedral subset of Rn. The set of solutions to
(23) is of the form {A∗} × X∗ for some A∗ > 0.
2. If the solution is not unique then µ is a linear combination of at most n − 1 portfolio risk
generators.
3. If the solution is unique, then the set of active portfolio risk generators spans the whole space
Rn, i.e., there are n linearly independent active portfolio risk generators.
Proof. (23) is a linear program, so the set of solutions is polyhedral. The mapping x 7→ D(RˆTx) is
convex, hence also continuous. Denote by d its minimum on the sphere {x ∈ Rn | ‖x‖ = 1}. This
minimum is strictly positive due to assumptions (M) and (D1). Employing further assumption (D2)
gives that {x ∈ Rn | D(RˆTx) ≤ A} is bounded for any A > 0; indeed, it is contained in the ball
with radius A/d. Hence, the set of solutions X′ to (23) is a bounded polyhedral set. It is expressed
by convex combinations of its extreme points at which the objective function is optimal. In each such
extreme point the coordinate A is identical, so X′ = {A∗} × X∗ for some A∗ > 0; the positivity of
A∗ follows from Lemma 4.3.
If X′ is a single point, then it is an extreme point. Since the constraint µTx ≥ ∆ is active (see
Lemma 4.3), (Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis, 1997, Theorem 2.2) implies that there are n indeces i1, . . . , in
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such that A = DTijx, j = 1, . . . ,M , and vectors (Dij )
n
j=1 are linearly independent, hence generate
Rn.
The proof of assertion 2 uses the dual of problem (23):
maximize ∆q,
subject to:
M∑
i=1
piDi − qµ = 0,
M∑
i=1
pi = 1,
q ≥ 0, pi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,M.
(24)
By the strong duality, ∆q = A∗ and we know A∗ > 0, hence q > 0. Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (1997,
Theorem 4.5) implies that the dual variables corresponding to inactive constraints are zero. Denote
by i1, . . . , ik the active constraints involving portfolio risk generators. Then the first constraint in the
above dual problem (24) reads:
µ =
1
q
k∑
j=1
pijDij . (25)
Assume now that the solution is not unique, i.e., X′ contains at least two extreme points and
therefore a line connecting them. Fix an internal point of that line (A∗, x∗). Since (A∗, x∗) is not an
extreme point of X′, the linear space spanned by active portfolio risk generators Dij , j = 1, . . . , k, has
dimension not larger than n−1 (there is at least one portfolio risk generator which is active at extreme
point of X′ and does not belong to lin{Di1 , . . . ,Dik}). This proves assertion 2 of the theorem.
Corollary 4.9. There is a finite number of hyperplanes (of dimensions from 1 to n − 1) such that: µ
belongs to one of them if and only if a solution to (15) is not unique. Therefore, the set of µ for which
the portfolio optimization problem has a unique solution has a full Lebesgue measure.
Proof. By Theorem 4.8, non-uniqueness of solutions coincides with µ being a linear combination of
at most n−1 portfolio risk generators, i.e., belongs to a linear space spanned by at most n−1 vectors
in Rn. This is a hyperplane of dimension at most n − 1, so it has a Lebesgue measure 0. There is
a finite number of ways to choose up to n − 1 vectors from the set of M vectors, so the number of
such hyperplanes is finite. A finite sum of sets of Lebesgue measure zero has the measure zero. Its
complement has therefore a full measure.
A practical consequence of the above theorem and corollary is that there is a unique optimal port-
folio in (15) unless µ is specially chosen to match the distribution of returns Rˆ and the risk measure.
In the following section we will show that the uniqueness of a solution, which implies multiple ac-
tive portfolio risk generators, leads to problems with optimal cooperative investment. We will also
show that there are natural settings when µ happens to be on one of the hyperplanes mentioned in the
corollary.
5 Cooperative investment
5.1 Theoretical framework
The general problem of cooperative investment can be formulated as follows, see Grechuk and Zabarankin
(2017). Let F ⊂ L2(Ω) be a feasible set, representing rates of return from feasible investment oppor-
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tunities on the market without a riskless asset:
F =
{
X
∣∣∣X = n∑
i=1
R(i)xi,
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
}
.
An individual portfolio optimization problem for agent i, i = 1, . . . ,m, is
max
X∈F
Ui(X), (26)
where Ui : L
2(Ω) → [−∞,∞) is the utility function of agent i. Instead of investing individually,
m agents can buy a joint portfolio X ∈ F and distribute it so that agent i receives a share Yi with∑
Yi = X. An allocation Y = (Y1, . . . Ym) is called feasible if
∑
Yi ∈ F , and Pareto optimal if
there is no feasible allocation Z = (Z1, . . . Zm) such that Ui(Yi) ≤ Ui(Zi)with at least one inequality
being strict.
A utility function U is called cash-invariant if U(X + C) = U(X) + C for all X ∈ L2(Ω) and
C ∈ R. Proposition 2 in Grechuk and Zabarankin (2017) implies that if all Ui, i = 1, . . . ,m, are
cash-invariant, and Y = (Y1, . . . Ym) is Pareto optimal, then X
∗ =
∑
Yi must solve the optimization
problem
sup
X∈F
U∗(X), (27)
where
U∗(X) ≡ sup
Z∈A(X)
m∑
i=1
Ui(Zi) (28)
with A(X) =
{
Z = (Z1, . . . , Zm) :
∑m
i=1 Zi = X, Zi ∈ L
2(Ω)
}
. Furthermore, if Y =
(Y1, . . . Ym) is any Pareto optimal allocation, then all Pareto optimal allocations are given by
(Y1 + C1, . . . , Ym + Cm), (29)
where C1, . . . Cm are constants with
∑m
i=1Ci = 0. Hence, the coalition should (i) solve the portfolio
optimization problem (27) to find an optimal portfolio X∗ for the whole group; (ii) find any Pareto
optimal way Y = (Y1, . . . Ym) to distribute X among group members, and finally (iii) agree on
constants C1, . . . Cm in (29) to select a specific Pareto-optimal allocation among the ones available.
Following risk sharing ideas (c.f. Section 3.2), Grechuk and Zabarankin (2017) suggested an
“equilibrium” approach to (iii), resulting in a “fair” allocation Ci = P (−Yi), where P : L
2(Ω)→ R
is a linear functional such that (a) P ∈ ∂U∗(X∗) and (b) P (X) ≤ P (X∗) for allX ∈ F . Proposition
7 in Grechuk and Zabarankin (2017) guarantees that such P exists provided that F is a convex set
and U∗ is a concave function. Because a concave function is differentiable almost everywhere, one
may expect that ∂U∗(X∗) is “typically” a singleton, in which case this approach leads to the unique
selection of a “fair” Pareto optimal allocation in (29). Below we show, however, that this intuition
may be wrong.
Mean-deviation portfolio optimization problem (15) cannot be formulated as (26) with a cash
invariant utility function. However, instead of minimizing a deviation measure subject to a constraint
on the expected return, investor imay choose to maximize Ui(X) = EX−Di(X) for some deviation
measure Di, i = 1, . . . ,m. In this formulation, Ui are cash-invariant, and the above theory applies.
U∗ in (28) is given by U∗(X) = EX −D∗(X), where
D∗(X) ≡ inf
Z∈A(X)
m∑
i=1
Di(Zi). (30)
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Lemma 5.1. Let Di be deviation measures with risk envelopes Qi, i = 1, . . . ,m. Then D
∗ is a
deviation measure with risk envelope Q∗ = Q1 ∩ · · · ∩ Qm. In particular, if all Di are finitely
generated, then so is D∗.
Proof. Proposition 3 in Rockafellar et al. (2006a) implies thatQ1, . . . ,Qm are closed, convex subsets
of the closed hyperplane H = {Q|EQ = 1} in L2(Ω) such that constant 1 is in their quasi-interior
relative toH . BecauseQ1, . . . ,Qm have a common point in their relative interiors, Rockafellar (1970,
Corollary 16.4.1) implies that D∗ can be represented in the form (16) with Q∗ = Q1 ∩ · · · ∩ Qm.
Because Q∗ is also closed, convex subset of H with constant 1 in quasi-interior relative to H , this
implies that D∗ is a deviation measure. Because intersection of polygons is a polygon, D∗ is finitely
generated provided that all Di are.
Theorem 5.2. Assume that investors’ utility functions are of the form Ui(X) = EX − Di(X) with
deviation measures Di finitely generated and none of the portfolio risk generators for D
∗ is parallel
to 1 := (1, . . . , 1)T or equal to µ = E[R]. Then a solution X∗ = RTx∗ to (27) has at least two
extreme risk identifiers.
Proof. We follow ideas from the proof of Theorem 4.8. Let Dˆ∗i = D
∗
i −E[R]. Then (27) is equivalent
to the following linear problem
minimize A,
subject to: xT Dˆ∗i −A ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,M,
xT1 = 1, (A, x) ∈ R× Rn.
(31)
By assumption this program has a solution, hence its dual also has a solution:
maximize q,
subject to:
M∑
k=1
pkDˆ
∗
k − q1 = 0,
M∑
k=1
pk = 1,
pk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,M, q ∈ R.
(32)
If the optimial solution q 6= 0, then the middle equation together with the assumption that none of Dˆ∗j ’s
is parallel to 1 implies that there must be at least two pk’s strictly positive. Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis
(1997, Theorem 4.5) states that the corresponding constraints in the primal problem are active, i.e.,
their respective portfolio risk generators are active for X∗. When q = 0, the assumption that none of
Dˆ∗j ’s is zero imply again that at least two pk’s must be non-zero.
Theorem 5.2 implies that there are at least two linearly independent active portfolio risk genera-
tors. Therefore, ∂U∗(X∗) is very far from being a singleton and there are multiple fair Pareto-optimal
solutions to the cooperative investment problem.
Remark 5.3. The problem of non-uniqueness of a risk identifier is particular for the cooperative in-
vestment. However, in the classical risk sharing problem for agents with utility functions based on
finitely generated deviation measures there is a unique fair Pareto optimal allocation for initial endow-
ments from a set of full Lebesgue measure, c.f. Section 3.2. This is unlike the cooperative investment
problem when the endowment to be distributed between agents comes from the set of measure zero.
Section 2 suggests a method for selecting a unique point in ∂U∗(X∗) (a unique risk identifier), and
hence a unique “fair” Pareto optimal allocation in (29). Specifically, this unique point is the Steiner
point (5)-(6) of set ∂U∗(X∗).
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5.2 Explicit example
Cash-or-nothing binary option O returns some fixed amount of cash C(O) if it expires in-the-money
but nothing otherwise. Assume that there are two such options A and B which expire in-the-money if
P > C1 and P > C2, respectively, where P is the (random) price of (the same) underlying asset, and
C1 < C2 are constants. Assume that options are offered for the same price p with C(A) = 2p and
C(B) = 8p. Each agent can invest a unit of capital into A and B, precisely 1− t into A and t into B,
to get profit −(1 − t) − t = −1; (1 − t) − t = 1 − 2t; or (1 − t) + 7t = 1 + 6t depending on the
relation of the price P with respect to C1 and C2. We assume that two agents think that these three
opportunities are equally probable.
For agent 1 with U1(X) = E[X]−CV aR
∆
2
3
(X) = −CV aR 2
3
(X), an optimal individual invest-
ment can be found from the linear program
max
a1,t
a1, s.t. X = (−1, 1 − 2t, 1 + 6t), E[QX] ≥ a1, ∀Q ∈ Q
1,
where Q1 =
{(
3
2 ,
3
2 , 0
)
,
(
3
2 , 0,
3
2
)
,
(
0, 32 ,
3
2
)}
=
{
Perm
(
3
2 ,
3
2 , 0
)}
, resulting in the optimum t = 0,
X = (−1, 1, 1), and the optimal value u∗1 = 0.
Similarly, for agent 2 with U2(X) = E[X]−
1
2MAD(X), the linear program
max
a2,t
a2, s.t.X = (−1, 1 − 2t, 1 + 6t), E[QX] ≥ a2, ∀Q ∈ Q
2,
where Q2 =
{
Perm
(
5
3 ,
2
3 ,
2
3
)
,Perm
(
4
3 ,
4
3 ,
1
3
)}
, returns t = 15 , with the optimal value u
∗
2 =
1
15 . The
cooperative investment corresponds to the linear program
max
a1,a2,Y1,Y2,t
a1 + a2, s.t. Y1 + Y2 = 2(−1, 1 − 2t, 1 + 6t), E[QYj] ≥ aj, ∀Q ∈ Q
j, j = 1, 2,
that is, we are simultaneously looking for optimal portfolio (t), and an optimal way to share it (Y1, Y2)
to maximize the sum of agents utilities. The optimal t is t = 15 , with Y1 + Y2 =
(
−2, 65 ,
22
5
)
, and
optimal value is u∗ = 215 > u
∗
1 + u
∗
2. The simplex method returns a solution Y1 = (
2
15 ,
2
15 ,
2
15 ),
Y2 = (−
32
15 ,
16
15 ,
64
15 ), with u1(Y1) =
2
15 and u2(Y2) = 0, which is obviously unfair. Because the
utilities are cash invariant, any solution in the form Y ′1 = Y1+C , Y
′
2 = Y2−C is Pareto-optimal, and
the question is how to select a “fair” C .
A standard approach for determining an exact value ofC is the following one (see Grechuk and Zabarankin
(2017)). Utility of a coalition U∗(X) can be written as
U∗(X) = min
Q∈Q∗
E[QX], (33)
where Q∗ can be found as (the vertices of) intersection of convex hulls of Q1 and Q2. In our case,
Q∗ =
{
Perm
(
3
2 , 1,
1
2
)
,Perm
(
4
3 ,
4
3 ,
1
3
)}
. The optimal portfolio X∗ = Y1 + Y2 =
(
−2, 65 ,
22
5
)
can be
found from optimization problem
maxU∗(X), s.t. X = 2(−1, 1 − 2t, 1 + 6t). (34)
Now, let Q∗ be the minimizer in (33) for X∗. Then C should be selected such that
E[Q∗(Y1 + C)] = E[Q
∗(Y2 − C)]. (35)
An intuition is that the investors should get the same profit under the critical scenarioQ∗. The problem
is that, for X∗ =
(
−2, 65 ,
22
5
)
, the minimizer Q∗ in (33) in not unique! Indeed, E[QX∗] = 215 for
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Q =
(
3
2 , 1,
1
2
)
, and also for Q =
(
4
3 ,
4
3 ,
1
3
)
. This is not a coincidence as we have shown in Theorem
5.2. While set of random variables X with non-unique risk identifier has measure 0, the optimal
portfolio in (34) is guaranteed to belong to this set. Consequently, the cooperative investment does
not have a unique solution in the case of finitely generated deviation measures.
In our example, the set of minimizers in (33) is the line interval with endpoints
(
3
2 , 1,
1
2
)
and(
4
3 ,
4
3 ,
1
3
)
. The Steiner point of this set is its midpoint Q∗ =
(
17
12 ,
7
6 ,
5
12
)
. From (35), this implies that
C = 12E[Q
∗(Y2 − Y1)] = −
1
15 . The equilibrium endowments are then Y1 + C = (
1
15 ,
1
15 ,
1
15 ) and
Y2 − C = (−
31
15 ,
17
15 ,
13
3 ).
6 Inverse portfolio problem
Following Palczewski and Palczewski (2018), let us formulate a problem inverse to (15) as follows.
Assume that we know a solution xM = (xM1 , . . . , x
M
n ) 6= 0 to (15), together with centered rates of
return Rˆ, deviation measure D, and ∆M > 0 the expected excess return of the portfolio xM . Can
we then “recover” µi, the expected excess returns of individual instruments? Are they determined
uniquely? We will give a positive answer to the first question and discuss a dichotomy faced by the
second: if the solution of the inverse problem is unique then the forward problem with the computed
µ has multiple solutions, while if the forward problem has a unique solution then there are many µ’s
solving the inverse problem.
6.1 An explicit formula using risk generators
Assume that ∆M > 0. Necessarily, xM 6= 0. Theorem 4 in Rockafellar et al. (2006b) states that, the
portfolio xM is a solution to (15) if and only if there is a risk identifier Q∗ for the random variable
RˆTxM such that
µ =
∆M
D(RˆTxM )
E[−RˆQ∗] =
∆M
(xM )TE[−RˆQ∗]
E[−RˆQ∗]. (36)
This follows since every finite deviation measure on a discrete probability space is continuous, c.f.
Rockafellar et al. (2006b, page 518).
Let Dij , j = 1, . . . , k, be the set of active portfolio risk generators for x
M . Then (36) amounts to
the existence of weights β1, . . . , βk ≥ 0, such that
∑k
j=1 βj = 1 and
µ =
∆M∑k
j=1 βjD
T
ij
xM
k∑
j=1
βjDij . (37)
From the above formula we immediately get the following characterization of vectors µ for which xM
is a solution to (15).
Lemma 6.1. The set of solutions M to an inverse optimization problem is convex and spanned
by points δDij , where Dij , j = 1, . . . , k, are active portfolio risk generators for x
M and δ =
∆/D(RˆTxM ):
M =
{
δ
k∑
j=1
βjDij
∣∣∣β ∈ [0,∞)k and k∑
j=1
βj = 1
}
.
Equipped with this characterization of the set M we demonstrate the link between the set of
solutions of the inverse and forward optimization problems.
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Theorem 6.2.
1. If xM is a unique solution to (15) for some µ, then the set of all solutions M to the inverse
optimization problem has at least n+ 1 extreme points. Moreover, all extreme points are of the
form δDij , where δ > 0 and Dij is an active portfolio risk generator for x
M .
2. If there is a unique active portfolio risk generator for xM , then the inverse optimization problem
has a unique solution µ∗ (the setM consists of one point). However, the optimization problem
(15) with ∆ = ∆M and µ = µ
∗ has multiple solutions: the set of solutions X∗ is a polyhedron
of dimension n− 1 and has at least n extreme points4.
The proof of the above theorem requires the following simple technical result.
Lemma 6.3. Given vi ∈ Rn, i = 1, . . . , k, let nˆ = rank(vi, i = 1, . . . , k) = dim(lin(v1, . . . , vk)).
Then N = conv(v1, . . . , vk) has at least nˆ+ 1 extreme points and all extreme points are from the set
{v1, . . . , vk}.
Proof. It follows from Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 18.3.1) that all extreme points of N are in
{v1, . . . , vk}. It remains to prove that there are at least nˆ + 1 extreme points. Assume the oppo-
site: there are only n′ < nˆ+ 1 extreme points vi1 , . . . , vin′ of N . Then N ⊂ A := lin(vi1 , . . . , vin′ )
and dim(A) ≤ n′+1. However, A is a linear space containing all points v1, . . . , vk so it also contains
lin(v1, . . . , vk). The latter space has dimension nˆ+ 1 by assumption, hence a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. From Theorem 4.8, the uniqueness of solutions to (15) implies that the set of
active portfolio risk generators Di1 , . . . ,Dik spans the whole space R
n, i.e., the dimension of a linear
space generated by those vectors is n. The conclusions follow from Lemma 6.3.
Assume now that there is a unique active portfolio risk generator. The uniqueness of solution to
the inverse optimization problem is clear from formula (37). Consider the equivalent form (23) for
the forward optimization problem. Recall that the set of all solutions to such a linear problem is a
convex bounded polyhedral set, a face of a polyhedral set generated by the constraints. The portfolio
xM is a solution for which there are exactly two active constraints: one with the unique portfolio risk
generator and one encoding the minimum expected return. This implies that the set of solutions is a
polyhedron of dimension n− 1. By Lemma 6.3 it must have at least n extreme points.
Corollary 6.4. In the case 1 of Theorem 6.2, if µ ∈ riM (µ is in the relative interior ofM), then the
forward optimization problem (15) has a unique solution for∆ = ∆M .
Proof. The implication is equivalent to: solution to (15) is not unique =⇒ µ /∈ riM. This follows
immediately from assertion 2 of Theorem 4.8 and Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 6.4).
6.2 Choice of a single solution to the inverse optimization problem
By Corollary 4.9, the solution to the portfolio optimization problem (15) is unique unless µ belongs
to a set of Lebesgue measure zero (a union of a finite number of hyperplanes). It is therefore common
that the inverse optimization problem has multiple solutions (Theorem 6.2).
How to choose a unique point from the set of solutions to the inverse optimization problem? In
view of (36), this is equivalent to the choice of a unique risk identifier Q∗ or rather a map fD :
L2(Ω)→ L2(Ω) that, for a deviation measure D, assigns to a random variable X ∈ L2(Ω) one of its
risk identifiers. We will call such a map fD a selector corresponding to the deviation measure D. We
say that fD is a robust selector if it is (i) a selector, and (ii) a robust map in sense of Definition 2.5.
4The dimension of a polyhedron P is the maximum number of affinely independent points contained in P minus 1.
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Lemma 6.5. For any finite deviation measure D there exists a unique robust selector fD.
Proof. By Rockafellar et al. (2006b, Proposition 1) we have ∂D(X) = 1 − Q(X). Hence the exis-
tence and uniqueness follow from Theorem 2.3.
Example 5. For mean absolute deviation MAD(X) = E[|X − EX|], the unique robust selector is
given by fD(X) = 1 + EZ − Z , where Z(ω) = 1, Z(ω) = 0, and Z(ω) = −1, for X(ω) > E[X],
X(ω) = E[X], and X(ω) < E[X], respectively.
6.3 Explicit examples
Let Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωN} with P(ωj) = wj , j = 1, . . . , N , and Rˆj = Rˆ(ωj). Consider a given
portfolio xM and denote X∗ = RˆTxM and x∗j = X
∗(ωj). Without loss of generality, we assume
that {ω1, . . . , ωN} are ordered in such a way that x
∗
1 ≤ x
∗
2 ≤ · · · ≤ x
∗
N . Since E[Rˆ] = 0, we have
E[X∗] = 0 and either x1 = · · · = xN = 0 or x1 < 0 < xN . The former case is impossible for
a non-zero portfolio xM under the assumption (M), therefore, we will concentrate on the non-trivial
latter case of non-zero return X∗. We will examine the inverse portfolio problem for risk measured
by MAD and by deviation CVaR.
6.3.1 Mean absolute deviation
Let k be the maximal index such that x∗k < 0 and m be the maximal index such that x
∗
m ≤ 0. It
follows from the discussion above that 1 ≤ k ≤ m. The inverse portfolio problem has solutions of
the form
µ =
∆M
MAD(X∗)
E[−Q∗Rˆ],
where Q∗ is a risk identifier for X∗. Recalling the form Q = 1 + E[Z] − Z of risk generators for
MAD, see Example 5, and E[Rˆ] = 0 we get E[−Q∗Rˆ] = E[ZRˆ]. If k = m, there is a unique risk
identifier given by Z(ωj) = 1{j>k} − 1{j≤k}, j = 1, . . . , N . Otherwise, there are 2(m− k) extreme
risk identifiers corresponding to Z’s of the form Z(ωj) = 1{j>m}−1{j≤k}+z1{j=j∗}, j = 1, . . . , N ,
for some k < j∗ ≤ m and z ∈ {−1, 1}. Therefore, the set of solutions of the inverse problem is given
by { N∑
j=m+1
wjRˆj −
k∑
j=1
wjRˆj +
m∑
j=k+1
λjwjRˆ
j
∣∣ λk+1, . . . , λm ∈ [−1, 1]
}
.
A robust selector corresponds to taking λ = 0 (see Example 5).
Example 6. Let N = 3 and P(ωj) =
1
3 , j = 1, 2, 3. There are two risky assets with centered returns
Rˆ1 = (−1,−2)
T , Rˆ2 = (−1, 1)
T and Rˆ3 = (2, 1)
T . The solution to the forward portfolio optimiza-
tion problem with µ = (0.4, 0.6) and ∆M = 0.5 is xM = (0.5, 0.5). Then X
∗ = (−1.5, 0, 1.5)
and MAD(X∗) = 1. The set of risk identifiers of X∗ is given by Z = (−1, z, 1) with an arbitrary
number z ∈ [−1, 1], i.e., Q∗ =
(
2 +
z
3
, 1 −
2
3
z,
z
3
)
. The corresponding set of solutions µ to the
inverse problem takes the form:
µ =
0.5
1
(
1
3
(−1)Rˆ1 +
1
3
zRˆ2 +
1
3
Rˆ3
)
=
(
0.5− z/6
0.5 + z/6
)
, z ∈ [−1, 1].
The unique robust selector suggested in Example 5 corresponds to z = 0, resulting in µ = (0.5, 0.5)T .
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6.3.2 Conditional Value at Risk
For deviation CVaR let k be the maximal index such that x∗k < −VaRα(X
∗) (set k = 0 is no such
index exists) and m be the maximal index such that x∗m ≤ −VaRα(X
∗). Then any risk identifier
Q∗ = (q1, . . . , qN ) of X
∗ satisfies, c.f. Rockafellar et al. (2006b),

0 ≤ qj ≤ 1/α,
N∑
j=1
wjqj = 1,
q1 = q2 = · · · = qk = 1/α,
qm+1 = · · · = qN = 0.
(38)
Hence,
µ =
∆M
CVaR∆α (X
∗)
(
1
α
k∑
j=1
wj(−Rˆj) +
m∑
j=k+1
wjqj(−Rˆj)
)
, (39)
where qk+1, . . . , qm are arbitrary numbers satisfying linear constraints
m∑
j=k+1
wjqj = 1−
1
α
k∑
j=1
wj , and 0 ≤ qj ≤ 1/α, j = k + 1, . . . ,m.
If m = k + 1, the risk identifier in (38) and µ in (39) are uniquely defined. For m > k + 1,
i.e., x∗k+1 = · · · = x
∗
m = −VaRα(X
∗), the inverse problem has infinitely many solutions. The
robust selector corresponds to qk+1 = · · · = qm, that is, µ =
∆M
CVaR∆α (X
∗)
(
1
α
∑k
j=1wj(−Rˆj) +
q
∑m
j=k+1wj(−Rˆj)
)
, where q =
(
1− 1
α
∑k
j=1wj
)
/
(∑m
j=k+1wj
)
.
Example 7. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} with uniform probability P(ωj) = 1/3. There are two risky assets
with centered returns Rˆ1 = (−1, 0)
T , Rˆ2 = (0,−1), Rˆ3 = (1, 1). Fix α = 0.05. The solution to
the forward portfolio optimization problem with µ = (1/3, 2/3) and ∆M = 0.5 is xM = (0.5, 0.5).
Then X∗ = (−0.5,−0.5, 1), −VaRα(X
∗) = −0.5, and k = 0, m = 2. The set of risk identifiers of
X∗ comprises Q = (q1, q2, 0), where 0 ≤ q1, q2 ≤ 20 and q1 + q2 = 3. Parameterizing q1 = q and
q2 = 3− q for q ∈ [0, 3], we obtain
µ =
0.5
1
(
1
3
q(−Rˆ1) +
1
3
(3− q)(−Rˆ2)
)
=
(
q/3
(3− q)/3
)
, q ∈ [0, 3].
The robust selector is given by q = 1.5, resulting in µ1 = µ2 = 0.5.
7 An application to Black-Litterman portfolio framework
It is due to comment on the findings of Section 6.1 from the perspective of an investor applying the
Black-Litterman theory to portfolio optimization. We start with a short presentation of the extension of
market-based Black-Litterman model of Meucci (2005) to general discrete distributions and deviation
measures. The reader is referred to Palczewski and Palczewski (2018) for a detailed discussion of a
parallel extension for continuous distributions.
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7.1 Theoretical view
The underlying assumption of the original Black-Litterman model (Black and Litterman, 1992) is that
the market is in equilibrium in which the mutual fund theorem holds, i.e., all investors hold risky asset
in the same proportions. In the general setting of deviation measures, Rockafellar et al. (2007) develop
an analogous theory and call the common portfolio of risky assets a master fund. It can be recovered
by solving (15) for a particular choice of ∆ = ∆M . We assume, as in the original framework, that
the real market is in equilibrium, so the master fund corresponds to market capitalizations of stocks:
we will call it a market portfolio xM . Further, acting in the spirit of Black and Litterman (1992) we
assume that the centered equilibrium distribution is known, for example, it is equal to the centered
empirical distribution of asset returns. The only parameter of the distribution which is unknown is its
location. To recover the latter, we solve an inverse optimization problem: knowing the solution xM to
problem (15) we find the mean excess return vector µeq for a given expected market return ∆ = ∆
M .
The distribution µeq + Rˆ is then called equilibrium distribution or prior distribution.
Investor’s views are represented by a m × n ‘pick matrix’ P and a vector v ∈ Rm. Each row
of P specifies combinations of assets and the corresponding entry in v provides a forecasted excess
return. The uncertainty (the lack of confidence) in the forecasts is represented by a zero-mean random
variable ε with a continuous distribution with full support on Rm, for example, a normal distribution
N(0, Q). The resulting Bayesian model is
prior: R ∼ µeq + Rˆ,
observation: V |[R = r] ∼ Pr + ε.
The posterior distribution of future returns R given V = v is concentrated on the same points as the
prior distribution but with different probabilities. It can be described by a new probability measure Q
on Ω, i.e., the posterior distribution of asset excess returns is that of µeq + Rˆ under Q
5. Following
Bayes formula, we set the unnormalized “density” of the posterior distribution:
X(ω) = fε
(
v − Pµeq − PRˆ(ω)
)
,
where fε is the density of ε. Then Q(ω)/P(ω) = X(ω)/EP[X]. The posterior distribution of asset
returns in then fed into the optimization problem (15).
Assume now that the deviation measure D is finitely generated. By Corollary 4.9 it should be
expected that the market portfolio is a unique solution to (15). Consequently, the inverse optimization
problem that determines the equilibrium distribution has many solutions (Theorem 6.2) resulting in
multitude of posterior distributions and, in effect, multitude of optimal portfolios. This is obviously
unacceptable in a financial context. Methods described in Section 6.2 can be used to select one
solution of the inverse optimization problem, therefore, bringing back the uniqueness of solution of
the complete portfolio optimization exercise.
7.2 Practical view
In practice, an investor models scenarios for centered returns Rˆ first and infers the market portfolio
xM , for example, from the market capitalization of assets or his current portfolio. It is therefore un-
likely that there is more than one active portfolio risk generator for the market portfolio, so the inverse
optimization problem has a unique solution. Indeed, portfolios with at least two active portfolio risk
5The location vector of the posterior distribution is rarely equal to µeq due to the reweighing of probabilities inQ relative
to P
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generators lie on a finite number of hyperplanes in Rn, hence, their Lebesgue measure is zero. It
is unlike the theoretical presentation above in which active portfolio risk generators for the market
portfolio span the whole space Rn. In theory, the market portfolio is a unique solution to the opti-
mization problem (15) for some target expected excess return ∆M . In practice, it solves an unlikely
portfolio optimization problem for which the space of solutions has dimension n, see Theorem 6.2.
If the investor has no opinions about the future returns, there will be many solutions to the forward
optimization problem (15). This is an essential difference with the original Black-Litterman model
for normal distributions where, in the absence of views, the forward optimization recovers the market
portfolio inputed into the inverse problem. It also transpires that with Lebesgue measure zero (on
views) an imposition of at least one investor’s view leads to a forward optimization problem with a
unique solution, c.f. Corollary 4.9.
Concluding, a practical application of the extension of Black-Litterman approach to discrete dis-
tributions and general deviation measures does not pose any difficulties but it contradicts assumptions
of the theoretical model. This is unlike the original Black-Litterman model (Litterman et al., 2004)
and its extension to general continuous distributions (Palczewski and Palczewski, 2018), where such
uniqueness problems do not exist.
7.3 Example
As in Example 7, let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} with uniform probability P(ωj) = 1/3. There are two risky
assets with centered returns Rˆ1 = (−1, 0)
T , Rˆ2 = (0,−1), Rˆ3 = (1, 1). Extreme risk identifiers for
CVaR∆5% are Q
e = {Perm(3, 0, 0)}. The set of portfolio risk generators consists of 3 vectors:
D1 = (1, 0)
T , D2 = (0, 1)
T , D3 = (−1,−1)
T .
Consider a market portfolio xM = (0.2, 0.8)T and its return∆M = 0.4. The only active portfolio risk
generator for xM is D2. From Lemma 6.1, the inverse optimization problem has a unique solution
µ∗ = (0, 0.5). Consider now the forward optimization problem with expected excess return ∆M and
mean excess return µ∗:
min
x1,x2
max
(
x1;x2;−x1 − x2
)
, subject to: x2 ≥ 0.8.
The set of solutions is X∗ =
{
(x1, 0.8) : x1 ∈ [−1.6, 0.8]
}
. Each solution in X∗ has CVaR∆5% equal
to 0.8 and the expected excess return of ∆M .
Application of any investor’s view perturbs the probabilities of events in Ω, therefore, changing
not only the risk profile of assets but usually their expected returns too. Indeed, imagine that investor’s
views shifted the probabilities to (14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2). The newmean excess return becomes µ = µ
∗+(14 ,
1
4)
T and
the centered returns are changed to Rˆ1 = (−
5
4 ,−
1
4 )
T , Rˆ2 = (−
1
4 ,−
5
4 ), Rˆ3 = (
3
4 ,
3
4 ). Consequently,
the new portfolio risk generators are Di = −Rˆi, i = 1, . . . , 3. Solving the forward portfolio problem
with the expected excess return ∆M yields a unique portfolio x
∗ = (25 ,
2
5) for which portfolio risk
generators D1 and D2 are active.
8 Conclusions
We have analyzed in depth forward and inverse portfolio optimization problems when asset returns
follow a finite number of scenarios and deviation measure is finitely generated (covering popular
deviation measures: CVaR, mixed CVaR and MAD). We discovered a dichotomy in the uniqueness
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of solutions for both problems: the forward and inverse problems cannot be simultaneously uniquely
solved (for the same data). Nevertheless, the set of parameters for which the non-uniqueness holds is
of measure zero. Although it may seem that the uniqueness problem is practically negligible, we have
demonstrated that this is not true in many applications, like capital allocation, cooperative investment,
and the generalized Black-Litterman model. In cooperative investment, the non-uniqueness affects
a “fair” way of distributing profit of joint investment between participating investors: for investors
with preferences described by utility functions derived from finitely generated deviation measures,
when the coalition’s forward optimization problem has a unique solution (which happens on the set
of model parameters of full measure), there are many risk identifiers for the optimal wealth which
prevents a unique “fair” allocation of wealth between investors. For the extended Black-Litterman
model, the market portfolio (up to a set of measure zero) corresponds to the model data for which
there is non-uniqueness of solutions to the forward problem. Recalling that this set has measure zero,
it clearly points to an internal inconsistency of the finite scenario setup for the Black-Litterman model.
This result is in contrast with the classical Black-Litterman model where the uniqueness holds for both
forward and inverse problems.
The above problem of non-uniqueness has been shown to be connected to the fact that a convex
function (here a risk or deviation measure) may not be everywhere differentiable, and, at points of
non-differentiability, has a non-unique sub-gradient. This issue has been addressed by introducing the
set of axioms, such that, for any convex function and at every point, there is a unique sub-gradient
satisfying these axioms. This sub-gradient happens to coincide with the Steiner point of the sub-
differential set.
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Appendix A Law invariant selectors
Section 6.2 introduces a method for selecting a unique solution to an inverse portfolio optimization
problem. The approach is based on the principle of robustness. Its advantage is that robust selector is
always uniquely determined.
Here we discuss an alternative approach which is based on the principle of law-invariance. The
concept of a law-invariant selector may not be unique for some deviation measures in which case the
law-invariance fails to resolve the non-uniqueness of the inverse optimization problem. However, it is
financially and probabilistically natural and works in some important special cases.
Definition A.1. A selector fD : L
2(Ω)→ L2(Ω) is called law-invariant ifE[Y1fD(X)] = E[Y2fD(X)]
whenever pairs of r.v.s (Y1,X), (Y2,X) ∈ L
2(Ω)× L2(Ω) have the same joint laws.
A deviation measure D is called law-invariant if D(X) = D(Y ) whenever r.v.s X and Y have
the same distribution. For example, CVaR∆α (CVaR-deviation) is law invariant for every α ∈ (0, 1).
Notice that not every deviation measure is law-invariant: a simple example of a non-law-invariant
deviation measure can be constructed on Ω = {ω1, ω2}, with P[ω1] = P[ω2] = 0.5, and
D(X) := max
{
X(ω1)−X(ω2), 2(X(ω2)−X(ω1))
}
. (40)
In the framework of uniform probability spaces, we prove below the existence, but not uniqueness,
of a law-invariant selector.
Theorem A.2. If Ω is uniform, then there exists a law-invariant selector fD for every law-invariant
deviation measure D.
Proof. It follows easily from Lemmas A.3, A.4, and A.5 below.
For non-uniform finite probability spaces, the notion of law-invariance as defined above is of little
use for defining a unique selector, because, for example, on Ω = {ω1, ω2} with P[ω1] 6= 0.5, r.v.s X
and Y have the same distribution if and only if X = Y , and, by definition, every deviation measure,
including (40), is law-invariant. For similar reasons, every selector fD on such probability space is
law-invariant. An appropriate extension of the notion of law-invariance to non-uniform probability
spaces follows from results below.
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An r.v. X dominates r.v. Y in second order stochastic dominance, denoted X 2 Y , if
t∫
−∞
FX(x)dx ≤
t∫
−∞
FY (x)dx, ∀t ∈ R.
An r.v. X dominates r.v. Y in concave order, denoted X c Y , if E[X] = E[Y ] and X 2 Y . A
deviation measure D is called consistent with concave order if D(X) ≤ D(Y ) whenever X c Y .
Lemma A.3. If a deviation measure D is consistent with the concave order, it is law-invariant. If Ω
is uniform, the converse statement also holds.
Proof. The first statement is trivial, and the second one is well-known, but the proof is usually pre-
sented for atomless probability space, see Dana (2005, Theorem 4.1). For a discrete uniform Ω, let
r.v.s X and Y take values x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xN and y1 ≤ · · · ≤ yN , respectively. Then X c Y is
equivalent to
k∑
i=1
xi ≥
k∑
i=1
yi, k = 1, . . . , N, (41)
with equality for k = N . Let us prove that in this case Y can be obtained fromX by a finite sequence
of operations
(z1, z2, . . . , zN )→ (z1, . . . , zi−1, zi − d, zi+1, . . . , zj−1, zj + d, zj+1, . . . , zN ),
d > 0, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N. (42)
The statement is trivial for N = 2, and the case N > 2 can be proved by induction. If
∑k
i=1 xi =∑k
i=1 yi for some k < N , we can apply induction hypothesis to pair of r.v.s X1 = (x1, . . . , xk)
and Y1 = (y1, . . . , yk), and separately to pair X2 = (xk+1, . . . , xN ) and Y2 = (yk+1, . . . , yN ), to
conclude that there exists a sequence of operations (42) transformingX1 to Y1 andX2 to Y2, and hence
X to Y . Otherwise, apply operation (42) toX with i = 1, j = N , and d = mink
∑k
i=1(xi− yi) > 0,
to get X = (x1, x2, . . . , xN )→ (x1 − d, x2, . . . , xN + d) = (z1, . . . , zN ) = Z. Then condition (41)
holds for z1, z2, . . . , zN in place of x1, x2, . . . , xN , with equality for some k < N , hence Z can be
transformed to Y by the argument above.
Because operation (42) can only increase a law-invariant deviation measure D, D(X) ≤ D(Y )
follows.
Lemma A.4. If for any r.v. X ∈ L2(Ω) the selector fD satisfies the condition
Q(ωi) = Q(ωj) whenever X(ωi) = X(ωj), (43)
where Q = fD(X), then it is law-invariant. If Ω is uniform, the converse statement also holds.
Proof. Condition (43) implies that Q = g(X) for some function g : R → R. Then E[Y1Q] =
E[Y1g(X)] = E[Y2g(X)] = E[Y2Q] whenever pairs of r.v.s (Y1,X) and (Y2,X) have the same joint
law.
Conversely, let Ω be uniform and X(ωi) = X(ωj). Then pairs of r.v.s (Ii,X) and (Ij ,X) have
the same joint law, where Ii and Ij are indicator functions for ωi and ωj , respectively. If fD is law-
invariant, this implies Q(ωi) = N · E[IiQ] = N · E[IjQ] = Q(ωj), where N = |Ω|, and (43)
follows.
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Lemmas A.3 and A.4 imply that consistency with the concave ordering and (43) are appropriate
extensions of the notion of law-invariance to non-uniform probability spaces for deviation measures
and selectors, respectively.
Lemma A.5. For every deviation measureD, consistent with concave ordering, there exists a selector
fD satisfying (43).
Proof. Fix a r.v. X, select any risk identifier Q for X, and let fD(X) := E[Q|X]. Then for all
Y ∈ L2(Ω),
E[(1 − fD(X))Y ] = E[(1 −E[Q|X])Y ] = E[(1−Q)(E[Y |X])] ≤ D(E[Y |X]) ≤ D(Y ),
where the first inequality follows from Q ∈ Q and (16), while the second one follows from con-
sistency of D with concave ordering and the fact that E[Y |X] c Y , see Föllmer and Schied (2011,
Corollary 2.61). Hence, fD(X) ∈ Q by (17). Because alsoE[(1−fD(X))X] = E[(1−E[Q|X])X] =
E[(1−Q)X] = D(X), fD(X) is in fact a risk identifier ofX, and condition (43) trivially holds.
Example 8. For CVaR-deviation D = CVaR∆α , there exists a unique selector satisfying (43), and it is
given by (see Cherny (2006))
fD(X) = Qα =


0, X > −V aRα(X),
cX , X = −V aRα(X),
1/α, X < −V aRα(X),
(44)
where constant cX ∈ [0, 1/α] is such that E[Q] = 1.
Example 9. For mixed CVaR-deviation (19), there exists a unique selector satisfying (43), and it is of
the form fD(X) = Qµ =
∫ 1
0 Qα µ(dα), where Qα is given by (44) (see Cherny (2006)).
Example 10. For mean absolute deviation MAD(X) = ‖X − EX‖1 (c.f. Example 2), if P (X =
EX) > 0, there are infinitely many selectors satisfying (43). Indeed, in Subsection 6.3.1, the set of
solutions of the inverse problem is given by
{ N∑
j=m+1
wjRˆj −
k∑
j=1
wjRˆj +
m∑
j=k+1
λjwjRˆ
j
∣∣ λk+1, . . . , λm ∈ [−1, 1]
}
.
The set of risk identifiers satisfying (43) corresponds to all such points in the above set for which
λk+1 = · · · = λm = λ ∈ [−1, 1].
Example 10 demonstrates that imposing condition (43) may not be sufficient for specifying a
unique solution. However, as demonstrated in the paper, the robust selector approach of Section 6.2
ensures uniqueness regardless of the deviation measure used.
The following lemma demonstrates the consistency of two suggested approaches.
LemmaA.6. LetΩ be uniform. Then, for every law-invariant deviation measureD, the corresponding
robust selector fD is law-invariant.
Proof. Let X ∈ L2(Ω) and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N be such that X(ωi) = X(ωj). Let T : L
2(Ω) → L2(Ω)
be a map interchanging indices i and j, that is, for Y = (y1, . . . , yN ),
T (Y ) = (y1, . . . , yi−1, yj , yi+1, . . . , yj−1, yi, yj+1, . . . , yN ).
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Then T (X) = X. LetAD ⊂ R
N be the set on whichD : RN → R is differentiable. This set has a full
Lebesgue measure due to the convexity of D. By law-invariance, D(T (Y )) = D(Y ), ∀Y . Hence,
for every Y ∈ AD such that T (Y ) ∈ AD, we have T (fD(Y )) = fD(T (Y )). Eqn. (11) implies for
any Y ∈ L2(Ω) ≡ RN ,
T (fD(Y )) = T
(
lim
ǫ→0
E[fD(Y + eǫ)]
)
= lim
ǫ→0
E[T (fD(Y + eǫ))]
= lim
ǫ→0
E[(fD(T (Y + eǫ))] = fD(T (Y )),
where eǫ is uniformly distributed on the ball Bǫ(0) ⊂ R
N . Because T (X) = X, this implies
T (fD(X)) = fD(X). Hence, (43) holds, and fD is law-invariant by Lemma A.4.
In conclusion, this paper suggests two principles for choosing a unique selector, and hence a
unique solution to the inverse optimization problem if the setM has more than one point. One prin-
ciple states that if D is law-invariant, we should have µi = µj in (36), whenever pairs (rˆ
(i), RˆTxM )
and (rˆ(j), RˆTxM ) have the same joint law. This principle is already sufficient to resolve the problem
for CVaR-deviation, and, more generally, for mixed CVaR-deviation, but, in general, may not return
a unique solution. Another principle postulates that selector should be “robust” as defined in Section
2, and has an advantage that it always returns a unique solution. However, its economic interpreta-
tion/justification is not as clear as for the law-invariance principle.
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